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Abstract 
The creation of spin-off firms from universities is seen as an important mechanism for 
the commercialization of research, and hence the overall contribution from 
universities to technological development and economic growth. Governments and 
universities are seeking to develop framework conditions that are conductive to spin-
off creation. The most prevalent of such initiatives are legislative changes at national 
level and the establishment of Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) at university level. 
The effectiveness of such initiatives is debated, but empirical evidence is limited. In 
this paper we analyze the full population of universities in Italy, Norway, and the UK; 
three countries adopting differing approaches to framework conditions, to test 
whether national and university level initiatives have an influence on the number of 
spin-offs created and the quality of these spin-offs. Building on institutional theory 
and using multi-level analysis, we find that changes in the institutional framework 
conditions at both national and university level are conductive to the creation of more 
spin-offs, but that the increase in quantity is at the expense of the quality of these 
firms. Hence, the effect of such top-down changes in framework conditions on the 
economic impact from universities seems to be more symbolic than substantive.  
 
Keywords: Commercialization of research, Institutional framework, Technology 
Transfer Offices, University spin-offs 
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1. Introduction 
Creating favorable framework conditions for entrepreneurship is perceived as an 
important tool to foster the creation and subsequent development of new ventures, 
especially among policy makers (Arshed et al. 2014; Nightingale and Coad 2014). 
The orientation of such initiatives is debated (Mason and Brown 2013; van Praag and 
van Stel 2013): while some argue that stimulating more entrepreneurship in general is 
favorable to the economy, others argue that support should be targeted at high quality, 
high growth firms only (Shane 2009).  
The creation of new ventures to commercialize university research is an 
example of potentially high-growth firms that could have significant economic impact 
at national and regional levels (Garnsey and Heffernan 2005; Lawton Smith and Ho 
2006; Vincett 2010). Governments and universities have introduced many initiatives 
to promote spin-off creation, such as legislative changes and economic support at 
national level and the establishment of Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) at 
university level. However, the effects of such initiatives on spin-off creation are not 
yet well understood. In this paper, we consider the effect of university and national 
level framework conditions on the creation and performance of university spin-off 
firms. 
Although there has been an increase in the number of university spin-offs 
created both in the US and Europe (Shane 2004; Wright et al. 2007), there are 
concerns that the majority of these firms have limited growth and impact (Grimaldi et 
al. 2011; Mowery 2011). Especially in Europe, several studies have noted that most 
university spin-offs remain small and appear to be lifestyle firms rather than high-
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growth ventures (Borlaug et al. 2009; Harrison and Leitch 2010). Hence, it could be 
questioned: i) whether the framework conditions put in place at national and 
university level may have different impacts on the quantity and quality of these firms, 
and ii) whether the observed growth in the number of university spin-offs results in a 
more symbolic, rather than substantive, increase in the economic impact from 
university entrepreneurship. 
The commercialization of research, and spin-off creation in particular, is a 
rather new and unfamiliar activity at many academic institutions across Europe. 
Creating a successful spin-off firm requires different competencies compared to the 
traditional core academic missions of teaching and research (Ambos et al. 2008; 
Rasmussen et al. 2011). The effectiveness of top-down policies and legislative 
changes to promote commercialization have been debated (Goldfarb and Henrekson 
2002; Kenney and Patton 2011); individual, social and cultural factors appear to have 
a much stronger impact on the propensity of academics to be involved in 
entrepreneurial activities than institutional arrangements such as TTOs (Clarysse et al. 
2011). Clearly, the creation and development of spin-offs in a university context is a 
highly complex task involving many actors within and outside the university 
organization (O'Shea et al. 2007; Rasmussen and Borch 2010). Hence, changes in the 
institutional framework, at both national and university-level, may only have modest 
effects unless fully embraced at all levels within the academic organization.  
Most research investigating university spin-off creation has measured the 
number of firms and paid limited attention to the quality of these firms (Powers and 
McDougall 2005; Van Looy et al. 2011). University spin-offs are typically resource 
constrained and need to overcome liabilities or thresholds to survive and grow 
(Rasmussen et al. 2011; Vohora et al. 2004). Obtaining venture capital (VC) is often 
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necessary to satisfy the capital requirements of spin-offs (i.e. key to bring a 
technology from the lab to the market), and overcoming this threshold improves the 
chances for success (Rosenbusch et al. 2013; Shane and Stuart 2002). Moreover, VC 
investments provide a qualified third-party evaluation of the commercial potential of 
the university spin-off. Hence, we use the first formal VC investment as a proxy to 
measure firm quality, and thus university performance in creating quality firms.  
Moreover, there is a paucity of research that compares different countries 
(Clarysse et al. 2007; Fini and Grimaldi 2016) and the evidence about the effect of 
changes in the institutional framework on spin-off creation and quality is limited. We 
therefore pose the following research question: How do changes in the institutional 
framework at national and university levels influence the quantity and the quality of 
spin-offs from a university? 
To explore this question we build on institutional theory proposing that 
changes in formal structures may result in symbolic rather than substantial 
modifications in operation efficiency (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Tolbert et al. 
2011). We rely on a unique panel dataset comprising the 2,323 spin-offs created from 
the full population of universities in Italy, Norway and the UK, between 2000 and 
2012. Our findings reveal that changes in the institutional framework, measured as 
changes in the intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation at national level and the 
establishment of a TTO at university level, have a positive effect on the number of 
spin-off created, while the quality of these ventures decreases.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature on framework 
conditions for entrepreneurship and university spin-offs. First, while several studies 
have looked at the link between institutional determinants and the number of spin-offs 
created from universities, this study, by using a multi-level approach, isolates the 
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effects of national and university level initiatives in predicting both the quantity and 
quality of the firms created. Second, most datasets of university spin-offs comprise a 
single university or single country, and, in the vast majority of the cases, rely on 
cross-sectional research designs. As this study compares the full population of 
universities across three different national contexts over a 13-years period, we extend 
our understanding of the within- and between-country influences on the quantity and 
quality of university spin-offs. Third, we show that differences in the macro-
institutional context regarding university IPR ownership are significantly associated 
with the extent and nature of university spin-offs.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop hypotheses 
related to how changes in university and national frameworks may influence the 
number of spin-offs created and the quality of these firms. The method section 
outlines our panel study of spin-off creation and quality in the full population of 
universities in Italy, Norway and the UK. Then the findings from our multi-level 
panel study are presented. Finally, conclusions and implications for research and 
practice are provided.  
 
2. Theory and development of hypotheses 
It is increasingly recognized that the institutional context where entrepreneurs operate 
both constraints and facilitates the opportunities for starting and growing a business 
(Urbano and Alvarez 2014; Welter and Smallbone 2011). The institutional context 
provides the ‘rules of the game in a society’ (North 1990), and include the economic, 
political, and socio-cultural environment in which the new venture is created (Shane 
2003). Emerging evidence shows that favorable institutional conditions at national 
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level increases the probability of entrepreneurship (Levie and Autio 2011; Urbano and 
Alvarez 2014). 
Institutional theory is particularly helpful in understanding entrepreneurship in 
organizational contexts, which are largely determined by culture, tradition, history, 
legal environment and economic incentives (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Bruton et al. 
2010). Entrepreneurs launching university spin-offs are likely to adapt their behavior 
and strategic model according to the opportunities and limitations of the formal and 
informal institutional framework they are exposed to (North 1990). Entrepreneurial 
activity is indeed influenced by the social context and institutional environment in 
which the scientists are embedded, and a supporting environment will impact 
scientists´ propensity to engage in spin-off activity (Huyghe and Knockaert 2015; 
Kenney and Goe 2004). One example is how scientists conform to the behavior of 
their heads and peers when deciding to engage in the commercialization of research 
(Bercovitz and Feldman 2008).  
Moreover, the institutional framework reduces uncertainty by providing 
human interaction with a stable structure (North 1990), providing a common basis 
where actors can evaluate the outcome of their behavior. Institutional pressures 
operate at many levels, from international systems to organizational subsystems (Scott 
2008). These levels can be viewed as interacting in a nested structure, where each 
institutional level will have distinct influence on scientists´ participation in 
entrepreneurship (Kenney and Goe 2004; Rasmussen et al. 2014). Hence, university 
scientists may consider whether entrepreneurial activity is rewarded, socially and 
economically, before they choose to engage in spin-off creation. Likewise, 
universities are likely to consider societal, legislative, and financial pressures when 
giving priority to entrepreneurial activities. External actors, such as investors or 
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industry partners, make similar judgments about the probability that the new venture 
is appropriate and will gain acceptance before they are willing to commit resources 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). Hence, to increase the chances for a new spin-off 
venture to be created and succeed, it should be regarded as a legitimate entity across 
many levels in its institutional environment (Scott 2008). An example of a university 
that has been remarkably productive in generating spin-offs is MIT. At MIT, spin-off 
creation is institutionalized through an inter-related set of factors both within and 
outside the university that has developed over several decades (O'Shea et al. 2007).  
This paper emphasizes how institutional changes at national level shape spin-
off formation. Governments have implemented legislative frameworks aimed at 
increasing the commercialization of research, including university spin-off formation. 
A well-known example is the US Bayh-Dole Act from 1980, which gave universities 
options to manage IPR and provided licensing preference to small businesses 
(Grimaldi et al. 2011; Stevens 2004). This legislation has been emulated by most 
European countries where IPR ownership has been assigned to universities, rather 
than being held by academics (the so-called professor’s privilege). The rationale has 
been to increase the commercial output from university research in terms of both spin-
off firm formation and technology transfer to established firms. 
While there is limited evidence on how institutional forces at national level 
influence university spin-off creation, patenting activity is a proxy of university 
technology transfer that has been extensively studied. The legislative changes appear 
highly successful because there has been a dramatic increase in university patenting 
following the implementation of the US Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery et al. 2001) and 
also following similar reforms in for instance Italy (Baldini et al. 2006). However, it 
has been debated whether the increasing number of patents reflects an average lower 
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quality of these patents (Henderson et al. 1998; Sampat et al. 2003) or have other 
negative effects on the impact of university technology transfer (Czarnitzki et al. 
2009). 
In parallel with patenting activity, we may expect the number of spin-offs to 
increase as a result of an augmented attention and institutional pressure upon 
universities to produce spin-offs. The rationale for this is that scientists, universities, 
TTOs, and other stakeholders will tend to strategically conform to the presence of 
such a new framework (Suchman 1995), and increase the number of entrepreneurial 
ventures. Conversely, changes in the institutional framework increase the level of 
environmental uncertainty, thus making successful entrepreneurship more difficult to 
unfold. It takes time for the new institutionalized practices to settle and generate the 
anticipated benefits. Hence, uncertainties about how the legal framework, the 
academic community, universities, and other stakeholders will respond to legislative 
changes may prevent important resource holders from supporting the new venture in 
the short-term (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). VCs, for example, will be less willing to 
invest in spin-off firms, which they already perceive as more difficult than other high-
tech ventures (Wright et al. 2006). Further, while institutional pressures may increase 
the number of spin-offs, the underlying base of viable research-based business 
opportunities at the university may not increase at the same pace. As such, the 
increase may comprise lower quality spin-offs that would not have surfaced in the 
previous legislative environment. Accordingly, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Universities in a national context with more changes in national IPR 
legislation will generate (a) more spin-off companies but of (b) lower quality, than 
universities in a context with less changes.  
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Spin-off formation is not only influenced by the institutional framework at the 
national level but also the organizational environment. This is evident by the uneven 
and path dependent numbers of spin-offs created across universities (O'Shea et al. 
2005). Moreover, it seems clear that university faculty complies with local group 
norms when it comes to involvement in spin-off creation (Bercovitz and Feldman 
2008; Louis et al. 1989).  
The creation of a TTO may be a symbolic reaction to institutional change, 
signaling that the university acknowledges commercialization and spin-off activity as 
a part of its mission. As such, the number of spin-offs created may be expected to 
increase, as scientists become encouraged to engage with TTOs and the officers in 
TTOs seek to meet activity-based targets. A related example is how patenting activity 
increases as a result of internal changes in IPR regulation at the university level 
(Baldini et al. 2006). However, the creation of quality university spin-offs is a highly 
complex process requiring access to entrepreneurial competencies to help the venture 
overcome the initial critical junctures (Rasmussen et al. 2011; Vohora et al. 2004). 
The creation of high-performing spin-offs appears to be more dependent on individual 
and group level characteristics, rather than on formal structures and policies (Kenney 
and Goe 2004; Rasmussen et al. 2014; Shane and Stuart 2002). TTOs need to have the 
capabilities to make spin-offs investor-ready and the social networks to identify and 
attract VC investors. Such capabilities take time to develop, and TTOs also need time 
to engage with the scientific environment at the university to influence the culture 
towards commercial exploitation of research results. Thus, there may be a mismatch 
between universities’ intention to create quality spin-offs and the resources and 
capabilities they possess to achieve this goal (Clarysse et al. 2005).  
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Further, the opportunity recognition capacity and prior entrepreneurial 
experience of individual academics are the strongest predictors of quality new spin-
off creation (Clarysse et al. 2011). To be effective, changes in the framework 
conditions, such as TTO establishment, need to trigger the development of 
appropriate competencies and behaviors at lower levels in the organization. For 
university spin-off creation this means that scientists and their surrounding 
environment must be both willing and capable of becoming engaged in pursuing 
potential high-growth spin-off firms. Without a larger transformation of the 
university, its capabilities and its surrounding ecosystem (Rasmussen and Borch 
2010), the establishment of a TTO may be only a symbolic act with limited short-term 
effect on bringing new research to the market. A TTO may improve output targets 
such as creating more spin-offs, but the additional new ventures are not as likely to 
become high-growth firms. Hence, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Universities with a TTO will generate (a) more spin-off companies but 
of (b) lower quality than universities without a TTO.  
 
Finally, government legislations and university-level support mechanisms may also 
interact in predicting academic entrepreneurship. Given the top-down nature of both 
the governmental and the university frameworks, we might expect a self-reinforcing 
effect. The idea is consistent with the evidence provided by (Fini et al. 2011), who 
show that the introduction of a new national legislative framework to support 
entrepreneurship and the creation of university TTOs complement each other in 
predicting academic entrepreneurship. Hence, we propose: 
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Hypothesis 3: Universities with a TTO and in a context with more changes in national 
IPR legislation will generate (a) more spin-off companies but of (b) lower quality, 
than universities in a context with less changes.  
 
3. Research design and data 
3.1 The institutional landscape 
To test our hypotheses, we used data from three European countries: Italy, Norway, 
and the UK, in which institutional changes to support the commercialization of 
university research, at both national and university levels, have been implemented 
following different pathways.  
At national level, as a result of the catalytic effect of the Bayh-Dole Act in the 
US (Mowery et al. 2001) and to boost technology transfer activities from public 
research institutions, several EU countries revoked the so-called “professor’s 
privilege”, which granted IPR on employees’ inventions not to the employer but to 
the employees themselves (Geuna and Rossi 2011). The UK was the first to abolish it 
in 1977, followed by France (1982), Spain (1986), the Netherlands (1995), Denmark 
(2000), Germany (2002) and Norway (2003). Italy, on the contrary, introduced the 
“professor’s privilege” late in 2001, abandoning it in 2005 (Baldini et al. 2014b).  
In a similar fashion, UK universities have been proactive in introducing 
internal policies to foster technology transfer activities by academics; i.e., by year 
2000 more than the 80% of UK universities had a TTO (Lockett et al. 2015; 
UNICO/NUBS 2002). The Norwegian universities, instead, established their TTOs 
later, between 2003 and 2005 (Borlaug et al. 2009); whereas the Italian ones have 
been the least proactive, with more than 40% of them without a TTO by the end of 
2005 (Baldini et al. 2014a). 
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This evidence suggests that, at both country and university level, the UK has 
been acting as a leader in establishing formal initiatives to enable technology transfer. 
Norway, with something of a lag, has put in place similar conditions, while Italy has 
lagged significantly behind.  
 
3.2 The sample  
To account for cross-national differences, we pooled data from different national and 
EU sources.   
As to country-level information, data on gross domestic product and 
unemployment rates have been retrieved using the World Bank Database (2014b). 
Data on the number of days required to start a business was obtained from Doing 
Business project of the World Bank (2014a). Data on investment freedom was from 
the Index of Economic Freedom provided annually by the Heritage Foundation 
(2014), whereas data on VC financing was downloaded from the Eurostat Statistics 
Database (2014). Finally, changes in the national IPR regimes have been coded 
according to the assessment provided by (Baldini et al. 2014a).   
University-level data have been collected using a two-pronged strategy. First, 
through the EUMIDA database, we extracted harmonized, EU-level, time-invariant 
information on: universities’ localization, legal status, year of establishment, 
educational fields, presence of a university hospital, and whether the university 
emphasizes Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics (STEM). The 
EUMIDA database stores information on 2,500 higher education institutions from 29 
EU countries. Data refers to year 2008 (for details see European Commission 2010).  
Secondly, we relied on national sources, collecting time-variant information 
on universities’ size (i.e., number of faculty members, number of PhD students), 
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operational characteristics (i.e., number and size of research grants awarded from 
public institutions, number and size of grants and contracts secured from private 
organizations) and intellectual eminence (i.e., national university quality rankings). 
For the UK, data on size and operations have been retrieved through the Higher 
Education Information Database for Institutions (HEIDI) (2014). Data on universities’ 
intellectual eminence have been assessed using the UK University League Tables and 
Rankings from the Complete University Guide (2014). For Norway comparable data 
on size and operations were obtained from the Database for Statistics on Higher 
Education (2014), Science and Technology Indicators for Norway (The Research 
Council of Norway 2013) and on national ranking from the CWTS Leiden Ranking 
(2014), respectively. For Italy, we used the MIUR websites (2013), as well as the 
overall academic rating score of Italian universities published in the “Grande Guida 
dell’Università” (Repubblica 2013).  
Finally, firm-level data have been retrieved through both the universities’ TTO 
and the national Companies’ Houses. For the UK, data on firms were mainly retrieved 
from the Spinouts UK Survey (2014) which includes all spin-off companies from UK 
universities and institutions since 2000. These data were further complemented and 
corroborated by data from FAME (2014) and Zephyr (2014). For Norway, firm-level 
data originate from a database maintained by the Research Council of Norway’s 
FORNY-program, which is designed to support universities in commercializing 
research results (Borlaug et al. 2009). These data have been complemented with 
information from the companies’ annual reports accessed through the Norwegian 
Register of Company Accounts (www.brreg.no/english) as well as TTOs’ databases, 
media archives, web-pages and other secondary information. For Italy, the list of 
firms has been compiled by contacting the universities’ TTOs every two years since 
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2003, the last time being 2013. Each firm has been looked up on Infocamere 
Telemaco (2013), the database of the Italian Companies House, retrieving information 
on the operational characteristics as well as on the capital structure. 
The final dataset comprises 185 universities (68 from Italy (IT), 4 from 
Norway (NO) and 113 from the UK) and their 2,323 spin-offs (878 from IT, 120 from 
NO, and 1325 from UK)1. The observation period is from 2000 to 2012.    
 
3.3 Dependent variables 
University spin-offs Quantity and Quality are the two dependent variables. We index 
quantity as a count of the number of university spin-offs from a given university in a 
given year. Firm quality denotes the future impact or growth potential of the venture. 
Following previous work (e.g. Lockett and Wright 2005), we operationalize quality as 
a count of the number of university spin-offs from a given university in a given year, 
which have received the first round of VC-financing in that year. Firm performance 
has been measured in many ways, with distinct benefits and concerns (Murphy et al. 
1996). University spin-offs typically have long development paths before entering a 
growth phase (Lawton Smith and Ho 2006), making traditional performance measures 
less relevant in the short-term. Obtaining external financing is a desired goal for the 
majority of university spin-offs, partly due to poor access to debt financing for this 
type of ventures (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). Being able to attract VC-financing 
provides an objective measure of external validation of venture quality in terms of 
expected returns. Although many venture-backed firms ultimately fail, research has 
shown that the ability to raise VC is significantly related to later success (e.g. Shane 
and Stuart 2002). 
                                                 
1 The significantly larger number of spin-offs per university in Norway is primarily driven by the 
country´s centralized university structure, comprising four relatively large research universities at the 
start of our observation period. 
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3.4 Predictor variables  
IPR Institutional Changes. To account for the effect of institutional changes in 
IPR-related-matters, we divided the number of changes in a country’s IPR legislation 
by the number of years included in the observation period (i.e. 13). This variable 
ranges from 0 (UK) to 0.15 (Italy). We also used alternative measures of the 
changes/turbulence in the institutional environment in a country, as discussed in the 
robustness checks section. 
Establishment of the University TTO. To measure the effect of TTO presence 
on university spin-offs quantity and quality, we specified a dummy variable that 
switches from 0 to 1 the year in which the TTO is established. If the TTO was 
established before 2000, the variable takes the value of 1 throughout the whole 
observation period.  
 
3.5 Control variables: Country-Level  
Investment Freedom. Because we expect that spin-off quality would be positively 
influenced by fewer constraints on the flow of investment capital, we include the 
Economic Freedom Index by the Heritage Foundation (2014), as a measure of the 
level of freedom for individuals and firms to move their resources into/out-of specific 
activities in a given country in a given year. This index may range from 0 to 100; and 
in our sample countries is bounded between 50 and 90.  
Ease of Doing Business. Higher-levels of bureaucracy may hinder 
entrepreneurial behaviors, especially the intention and likelihood of entry. To account 
for this aspect in the spin-off quantity model, we used data from the World Bank 
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(2014a), examining the number of days required to start a business in a given country 
in a given year. In the sample, this variable ranges from 6 to 23.  
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP). The environmental conditions also 
influence the structure of opportunities to be exploited by individuals. The higher the 
GDP, the more the resources flowing into innovation and research, the higher the 
likelihood that entrepreneurship would occur. To account for this, we included in our 
models the GDP of a given country in a given year, discounted by the yearly 
consumer price index. The variable was logarithm transformed and its value in the 
sample ranges from 10.4 to 11.1.  
Unemployment Rate. Similarly, countries with higher unemployment rates 
may generate less high-tech entrepreneurship compared to those with lower rates. To 
properly account for this, we examined the unemployment rate of a given country in a 
given year. The rate in our sample is bounded between 2.5 and 10.8.  
VC Availability. Finally, the number of spin-offs financed by VCs can be 
influenced by the availably of VC financing. Hence, we control for the amount of 
early stage VC investments in a given country in a given year. The variable has been 
retrieved via the Eurostat Statistics Database (2014), is expressed in million Euros and 
ranges between 22 and 4,240.  
 
3.6 Control variables: Region-Level  
Some regional-level factors may also impact on spin-off foundation and growth. To 
account for this, via the Eurostat Statistics Database (2014), we have retrieved data at 
NUTS 2 regional level, between 2000 and 2012, on the Total intramural R&D 
expenditure (GERD), the Population on 1 January as well as the Unemployment 
rates. 
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3.7 Control variables: University-Level  
Foundation Year. Under the assumption that the older the university, the 
higher the prestige of the institution, the higher its impact, we control for the 
university’s year of establishment.  
Size. University size may also be a predictor of university spin-off activity. 
The higher the number of faculty members and support staff, the higher the likelihood 
that some research may be effectively transferred to the market. To account for this 
we control for the number of employees of a given university in a given year. 
Sponsored research expenditure. Because the knowledge exploited by spin-
offs is generated by university research, we may expect that that the amount of 
research money secured from for-profit institutions by a given university in a given 
year will be likely related to the spin-off quantity and quality. The variable is 
operationalized in monetary terms and is discounted for the yearly consumer price 
index. 
Prior knowledge in technology-transfer activities. University TTO expertise in 
supporting spin-offs may take some time to develop. Some universities have been 
involved in technology transfer activities before 2000. To account for the 
accumulated knowledge and experience, we control for the cumulative number of 
university spin-offs established before 2000 by a given university. 
Cumulative spin-off entry. The number of firms from a given university 
receiving VC funding in a given year can be positively correlated with the total 
number of spin-offs emerging from that university until the year of observation. We 
therefore control for the cumulative number of spin-off from a university up to the 
focal year in the quality model.  
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Average age of spin-offs. Firm age can predict the likelihood of receiving VC 
financing. To account for this, we have calculated the average age of the spin-off 
portfolio, for any given university in any given year. The variable ranges between 0 
and 12.  
Intellectual eminence. We also assume that the universities’ intellectual 
eminence may be related to their ability to foster entrepreneurial behavior by 
academics. We relied on national rankings to categorize each university in either the 
top 25%, 25-50%, 50-75% or lower 25%. The variable is country-specific and time-
variant. 
Educational fields. We account for the comprehensiveness of the educational 
offering by the universities under scrutiny. Relying on the information stored in 
EUMIDA, we assessed whether each university had education programs in each of 
the following fields: General programs; Education; Humanities and Arts; Social 
Sciences, Business and Law; Sciences; Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction; 
Agriculture; Health and Welfare; Services. The nine variables are time-invariant, non-
mutually exclusive, and can take the value of either 1 or 2. 
Industrial variance. In the quality model, we also controlled for the variance 
in the industrial sectors of the spin-offs established by each university in a given year. 
This is because firm quality in terms of access to VC could be influenced by the 
number of firms that are similar to them emerging from the same university in the 
same year. This variable is measured by the Herfindahl index. It is measured by the 
sum of the squares of the shares of spin-offs of a university in a given year within an 
industrial sector. ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the proportion of total spin-offs of a university 
in a given year within sector i, and N is the number of industrial sectors. The higher 
the industrial variance, the lower the critical mass of similar others, the less the 
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competition and more resources a firm would get, which would result in better 
performance. 
High-tech firm rate. We finally account for the entry rate of firms established 
in high-tech sectors (i.e., Bio/Parma and ICT) that spun out from each university 
every year.  
 
4. Econometric models 
As our data feature a hierarchical structure at multiple levels, we applied a multilevel 
modeling approach to model and test our hypotheses (Bliese et al. 2007). Specifically, 
our dataset comprises time-series cross-sectional data at university level, which is 
clustered within three countries, over 13 years. Therefore, university-level data are 
likely to be correlated over-time; moreover, universities from the same country may 
be more similar than those selected randomly. Hence, ignoring the multilevel 
structure can result in violating the assumption of data independence in traditional 
multiple regressions, which gives rise to unreliable estimates. Indeed, multilevel 
modeling enables us to account for interdependence by capturing residuals at different 
levels, and to specify country-year fixed effects.  
Moreover, we are not only interested in the effect of university-level 
predictors, but we also aim to assess to what extent country-level institutional 
dimensions impact the quantity and quality of university spinoffs. Multilevel 
modeling provides ways to evaluate the impact of factors from different levels 
simultaneously, and makes the test of cross-level interaction effects possible.  
Finally, as both dependent variables in the analyses are measured by count 
data with over-dispersion, we chose multilevel Negative Binomial regressions over 
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multilevel Poisson modeling, nesting university-level data (level 1) into country-level 
ones (level 2).  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Main models  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for all 
variables in our models. With respect to the main effects, TTO establishment is 
positively correlated with both quantity and quality, whereas IPR-institutional 
changes are weakly correlated with quantity and negatively correlated with quality. 
No multicollinearity issues emerge from the data.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
We present the estimation results on the quantity of university spin-offs in Table 3. 
Model 1 shows the baseline model that includes university-level and country-level 
control variables only. The main effects of institutional changes and TTO 
establishment were estimated in Model 2. The cross-level interaction effect was tested 
in Model 3 with the introduction of the cross-level interaction term. 
Model 2 shows that the level of institutional changes in the IPR regime at 
country level has a significant positive influence on the number of university spin-offs 
established (0.521, p<0.001). The establishment of a university TTO has the same 
significant positive effect (0.178, p<0.05). The interaction effect of university TTO 
and country-level institutional changes shown in Model 3 is positive and significant 
(0.336, p<0.001). Therefore, Hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a are supported. 
To better elaborate the cross-level interaction effect of establishment of 
university TTO and institutional changes in IPR at country level on the quantity of 
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university spin-offs, we compared the marginal effect of universities with and without 
TTO across different levels of institutional changes (see Figure 1). Figure 1 (left part) 
shows the predictive margins of TTO (at value 0 and 1 respectively) across different 
values of institutional changes. We can see that more changes in the IPR regime are 
associated with a higher number of university spin-offs. Universities with a TTO in 
place almost always produce more spin-offs than those without a TTO. The difference 
(i.e., the gap between the two lines) is increasing, in a statistically significant way, 
with the increasing level of changes in IPR regime at country level. This is 
represented graphically with the conditional marginal effects of TTO shown in Figure 
1 (right part). We also showed the predictive margins and the conditional marginal 
effects of TTO with a 95% confidence interval in the appendix (see Figure A-1/2). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The estimation results on the quality of university spin-offs are shown in Table 4. As 
before, Model 4 shows the baseline model with control variables only. Model 5 shows 
the main effects of IPR institutional changes and TTO establishment. The cross-level 
interaction effect is displayed in Model 6. Regression results for Model 5 show that 
country-level institutional changes in IPR regime have a significant negative 
influence on the quality of university spin-offs (-0.590, p<0.01). The establishment of 
a university TTO has a negative effect on the quality of university spin-offs, although 
the coefficient is only marginally significant (-0.341, p<0.1). The interaction effect of 
the two variables is also negative and statistically significant (-0.685, p<0.01) as 
shown in Model 6. The above results provide support for Hypotheses 1b, 2b and 3b. 
We plotted the interaction effect of the two main explanatory variables on the 
quality of university spin-offs in Figure 2. As predicted, Figure 2 shows that the more 
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changes of IPR regime in a country, the lower the quality of university spin-offs 
measured by the number of spin-offs receiving VC financing. Universities with a 
TTO in place produce less spin-offs receiving VC financing than those without a 
TTO. The negative effect is intensified by the increasing level of changes in IPR 
regime at country level. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
To check for the stability and replicability of our results, we ran the selected 
econometric specifications using two alternative operationalizations of the IPR 
Institutional Changes construct. We obtained the first measure by dividing the 
number of years in which the ‘professor’s privilege’ was in place during the 
observation period, by the total years included in the observation period (13). This 
index ranges from 0 (UK) to 0.38 (Italy). The second measure was the count of 
absolute number of changes in the IPR legislation, which is the number of switches 
between enforcement of ‘professor’s privilege’ and ‘university’s privilege’ in a 
country over the 13 years observation time. The value of this variable changes from 0 
(UK) to 2 (Italy). We adopted the same model specifications for both spin-off 
quantity and quality in the robustness checks as the ones used in the previous test 
respectively. The results remain unchanged. We present the results of the robustness 
checks in Appendixes A and B.  
Furthermore, by using a seemingly unrelated regression approach, we modeled 
simultaneously quantity and quality, assuming that the two equations are partially 
related through their error terms. This approach gave us the same set of results as we 
had in our original models (results are available upon request).  
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As a further robustness check, we also tested for the impact of alternative 
policies and structural changes introduced in the three countries over the period under 
scrutiny. Specifically, we focused on the introduction of a R&D tax-credit scheme. 
University spin-offs are R&D-intensive firms that frequently use such instruments. 
Consistent with the IPR-related measures, the variable was operationalized as the total 
number of changes in the tax-credit scheme during the observation period, as well as 
total number of changes over the total number of years included in the observation 
period. Results are very similar to the ones obtained with the IPR scheme (available 
upon request).  
 We also adopted an alternative measure for the quality of university spin-offs. 
Rather than using count data, we measured it as the share of firms receiving VC 
funding in each university each year. Results are qualitatively the same.  
Moreover, we included additional control variables, such as the share of firms 
receiving VC funding in past (e.g., discrete and cumulative rate in the previous two 
years or since the beginning of the observation period). Similar results were obtained.  
Finally, we split the sample according to university rankings. Results based on 
the top 50 percentile confirmed our results. 
 
5.3 Economic significance 
We also evaluated the economic significance of our findings. For spin-offs quantity, 
the natural log of the expected number of spin-offs in a given year is .178 units higher 
for universities with a TTO. In other words, keeping other factors constant, the 
incidence rate of spin-off creation in a given year is about 20% higher (i.e. exp (.178) 
- 1 =.195) for a university with a TTO than if the university did not have a TTO. One 
additional IPR institutional change increase the natural log of the expected number of 
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university spin-offs in a given year by .521 units. Hence, everything else being equal, 
a change in the IPR legislation at national level increases the expected number of 
university spin-offs in a given year by nearly 70% (i.e., exp (.521) - 1 = .683).   
The spin-offs quality models shows that the natural log of the expected 
number of spin-offs that receive first-round VC funding in a given year is .342 units 
lower for universities with a TTO. In other words, everything being equal, universities 
with a TTO has about 30% fewer spin-offs that receive first-round VC funding in a 
given year (i.e., exp (-.342) - 1 = -.29). Moreover, one IPR institutional change 
reduces the incidence rate of university spin-offs that receive first-round VC funding 
by a factor of .55 (i.e., exp (-.59) = .55). This means that one IPR institutional change 
decreases the number of university spin-offs that receive first-round VC funding by 
45% in a given year (i.e., exp (-.59) - 1 = -.45). 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Findings and contribution 
Our study, using a unique panel dataset and multi-level analysis comprising 
the populations of university spin-offs in three European countries, shows that 
changes in the institutional framework have a positive effect on the number of spin-
offs created, but a negative effect on the quality of these ventures, as measured by 
their ability to attract VC financing. These findings indicate that the implementation 
of new institutional frameworks to increase spin-off creation has an effect, but this 
effect appears to be more symbolic than substantive. The response within the 
university organization is a significant increase in the number of firms created, while 
the potential economic impact of these firms seems to be more modest.  
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Universities and TTOs appear to be complying with the new institutional 
norms of creating more spin-offs. Institutional pressures and expectations provide 
strong incentives for TTOs to generate visible results and TTO officers consider the 
number of new commercial ventures created as an important objective (Thursby et al. 
2001). There are also examples of explicit incentives embedded in the institutional 
framework, such as bonus schemes providing additional TTO funding for each new 
firm established (Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen 2012). However, any substantive 
impact on spin-off firm quality needs a much longer time to manifest because 
founding new firms is easier than the long-term involvement contributing to firm 
success.  
We argue that increasing the number of spin-offs may come at the expense of 
the quality of these firms, because the underlying commercial potential of the 
scientific research at the university remains unchanged. However, the negative effects 
on the quality of these firms were stronger than anticipated. Changes in the 
institutional framework seems to have a detrimental effect on spin-off quality beyond 
a decrease in average quality resulting from lower quality of the additional spin-offs 
created. Our findings indicate an absolute decrease in the number of firms able to 
raise VC funding, suggesting that the presence of a TTO and legislative changes do 
more harm than good.  
Such a conclusion would be speculative because there may be several reasons 
explaining why university spin-offs attract less VC funding following a TTO 
establishment or legislative change. Possible explanations may be related to a lower 
demand for VC financing among university spin-offs, a lower supply of VC 
financing, or unrelated methodological issues. We will discuss these in turn. 
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First, changes in the profile or composition of the universities´ spin-off 
portfolio may reduce the demand for VC funding. In contrast to individual scientists, 
TTOs have more flexibility in selecting commercialization instruments. Many 
scientific discoveries, in particular within the life sciences, can be successfully 
licensed directly to industry (Thursby and Kemp 2002). As shown in a comparative 
study between Sweden and the US, the incentive scheme under the ‘professor’s 
privilege’ favors the creation of spin-offs, while TTOs tend to prefer licensing to an 
established firm, which generates a higher commercialization success (Damsgaard 
and Thursby 2013). Hence, the lower observed quality of spin-offs may be because a 
larger share of high-potential inventions are licensed when a TTO infrastructure is in 
place. While the effect of institutional changes appears negative for spin-off quality, it 
would be premature to conclude that the total effect on university technology transfer 
is negative. 
Moreover, the establishment of TTOs creates an infrastructure at universities 
where different resources may be added such as access to facilities and funding 
arrangements such as proof-of-concept and pre-seed funds (Kochenkova et al. 2015; 
Munari et al. 2015). Better access to early stage funding internally may reduce the 
demand for VC funding among university spin-offs. This is especially true in 
technological domains with lower capital intensity. 
Second, the supply of VC may be reduced as a consequence of institutional 
changes because  university spin-offs become less attractive among potential 
investors. The establishment of TTOs and to some degree legislative changes at 
national level is part of an increasing formalization of university technology transfer 
(Geuna and Muscio 2009). The more formal processes employed by TTOs could have 
consequences that reduce the attractiveness of USOs as investment targets by VCs. 
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The involvement of TTOs may lead to overvaluation of the spin-off from the offset, 
which is detrimental to raising VC later due to unrealistic price expectations (Clarysse 
et al. 2007). Further, it is increasingly common for TTOs to take equity positions in 
lieu of licensing agreements as compensation for supplying the spin-off´s initial IP 
(Savva and Taneri 2015). VC investors may be more reluctant to invest in firms with 
a more complicated ownership structure and where the university, rather than the 
founders, holds a significant ownership stake leaving less equity available to 
incentivize the entrepreneurs.  
Finally, methodological issues may have impacted our results. The 
introduction of a more formalized technology transfer process may change the 
universities’ reporting practice for spin-offs. Universities with ‘professor’s privilege’, 
without a TTO infrastructure in place, may not record all start-ups by their faculty at 
an early stage. Hence, some of the early failures may go unnoticed, while the more 
successful cases are picked up and reported as spin-offs from the institution. Another 
issue currently debated is the tendency of professors to ‘by-pass’ the formal 
technology transfer infrastructure. Academic entrepreneurs may in some cases avoid 
disclosure to the TTO in order to circumvent the formal process that follows (Fini et 
al. 2010; Siegel et al. 2004). Aldridge and Audretsch (2010) find that “back door” 
commercialization is more likely in cases with more experienced entrepreneurs and 
with increased perceived value of the IP. Hence, deliberate avoidance of TTO 
disclosure and involvement might be a source of underreporting in our data, which 
potentially could reduce the number of high-potential spin-off formally reported. 
Although we control for the supply of VC financing in our analysis, our 
results could also be impacted by changes in the structure of early-stage VC 
financing. Research indicates a migration to larger deal sizes due to persistently lower 
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returns in early stage investing (Mason 2012). It is possible that increased investment 
concentration has impacted the firm´s ability to raise VC, independent of volume of 
VC funds or underlying firm quality. We encourage future research to explore this 
possibility. 
 
6.2 Implications 
Our findings have a number of implications for practice and policy. It has been 
debated whether the most efficient policies for commercialization of research are 
bottom-up or top-down (Goldfarb and Henrekson 2002; Rasmussen 2008). Top-down 
policies face the risk of being met by strategic responses at the lower levels (Oliver 
1991), thus enacting mimetic behaviors (Baldini et al. 2014b). Top-down initiatives 
may lead to symbolic conformance in terms of an increase in the number of spin-offs. 
However, the creation of quality spin-offs is a complex and resource demanding 
process that requires more substantial changes at all levels within the universities. 
Hence, legislative changes and university level initiatives, such as the establishment 
of TTOs, need to be complemented with bottom-up initiatives.  
Our results therefore provide a general indication across countries that the 
effects of policy changes and TTO establishment may not lead to the intended 
increase in the creation of high performing spin-offs. Rather, it seems important that 
universities develop capabilities within their entire organization and surrounding 
ecosystem that can provide the necessary support to make spin-offs investor ready for 
VC and other external investment. Earlier qualitative evidence from across European 
universities (Clarysse et al. 2005) has identified capability deficiencies in TTOs in 
this respect, and our evidence would seem to suggest that these within and between 
country differences persist. It also seems important that universities and TTOs in 
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different countries develop the social capital to be able to attract VC and other 
external investment (Rasmussen et al. 2015), especially as VC investors typically 
view spin-offs as being more challenging propositions than regular high tech start-ups 
(Wright et al. 2006). Our analysis also suggests a need for policy towards the 
commercialization of university research to be connected closely to the development 
of policies towards entrepreneurship and the funding of entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
6.3 Limitations 
Our paper has limitations that open up avenues for further research. First, 
while we selected countries with differences in their institutional approaches to 
academic entrepreneurship, further research is needed to explore whether our results 
hold for other countries or whether there are additional differences.  
Second, we measured quality by the ability of spin-offs to attract VC funding. 
Data limitations restricted our ability to measure access to other external funding 
notably business angel funding which may be especially important for early stage 
spin-off ventures. Further research is needed to explore the role of access to different 
forms of external investment funds. Additionally, we acknowledge that the 
performance of the spin-off is a dynamic variable and that TTO actions may impact 
beyond spin-off birth. However, a large number of spin-offs do not generate revenues 
for many years, if at all, and accounting data are incomplete for a sizable proportion 
of our sample not least because small firms have exemptions from reporting financial 
information. As a result, we do not analyze subsequent accounting, financial and 
economic performance of spin-offs following VC investment. Further research is 
needed to explore this aspect, although cross-country data limitations may constrain 
this approach.  
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Third, as we have indicated, policies towards the commercialization of 
university IP have varied over time within and across countries, which have 
implications for university strategies towards the extent and types of spin-offs 
(Lockett et al. 2015). While our panel data analysis helps to pick up the quantitative 
effects of these variations, complementary fine-grained qualitative analysis is required 
concerning the adaptation of the spin-off processes adopted by universities in 
different countries. For example, TTOs may have different capabilities and routines 
(Lockett and Wright 2005).  Further, TTOs may be centralized or decentralized which 
may have implications for the locus of capabilities to support spin-offs and the social 
capital of technology transfer officers to access external funding (Huyghe et al. 2014). 
Similarly, different TTOs may have different remits regarding the promotion of 
different dimensions of academic entrepreneurship which may be reflected in the 
extent to which they focus on spin-off activity. Further research might attempt to 
analyze TTO remits, for example by exploring their mission statements. Such mission 
statements may be time variant as TTOs evolve their approaches to academic 
entrepreneurship.  
Fourth, and relatedly, we have focused on within- and across-country 
differences in university spin-offs but TTOs are also involved to a greater or lesser 
extend or degree of success in other dimensions of commercialization activity. Given 
the limited qualitative (Wright et al. 2008) and quantitative analyses (e.g. Chapple et 
al. 2005) of these multiple outputs, additional cross-country examination is warranted. 
Fifth, our results indicate the importance of bottom-up initiatives and TTOs 
programs improving the motivation and ability of scientists to launch successful 
university spin-offs. However, due to data limitations we were not able to measure the 
implementation of such initiatives and how this explains variance in quality of spin-
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offs. Although challenging to study in large-scale cross-country research, further 
qualitative studies are required to understand in greater detail how TTOs can 
successfully influence the quality of their spin-off ventures.  
Sixth, although we measured differences in investment freedom across 
countries, data limitations restricted our ability to account for cross-country and 
within-country differences in access to external finance. Countries differ in the extent 
of development of VC markets as well as business angel markets, but the proliferation 
of new sources of venture funding such as crowdfunding and accelerators (Clarysse et 
al., 2015) potentially introduces additional within and between country variations. 
Subsequent efforts to encompass these differences will be become more important 
over time. 
Seventh, while our focus was on country level differences, policy variations 
that impact university spin-off activity may also differ at regional level (Munari et al. 
2015). Additional analysis focused on regional aspects may help extend the insights 
presented here.   
Finally, the private or public legal status of a university may be important. 
Private universities may be less constrained in investing resources into technology 
transfer activities compared to public ones. However, we were unable to explore this 
aspect of the influence on spin-off activity, as in our three countries the number of 
private universities is too small. Future studies might examine this issue in contexts 
with a higher incidence of private universities, such as the US.  
6.4 Conclusions 
In sum, the creation of spin-off firms from universities are increasingly seen 
internationally as an important mechanism for the commercialization of research, and 
hence form a central element in the overall contribution of universities to technology 
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development and economic growth. Governments and universities are developing 
framework conditions that are conductive to spin-offs but as yet there is limited 
systematic cross-country comparative analysis of the influences on the extent and 
quality of spin-offs created. Our study adds to the so far limited cross-country 
analyses of these influences and points the way to further cross-country analyses and 
policy developments.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Dependent variables and main predictors      
U: Spinout quantity 2405 0.97 2.11 0 31 
U: Spinout quality 2405 0.15 0.59 0 8 
U: TTO establishment 2405 0.72 0.45 0 1 
C: IPR Institutional changes 2405 0.06 0.07 0 0.15 
 
University-level controls      
U: Cumulative entry 2405 6.79 14.44 0 197 
U: Prior knowledge in tech-transfer activities 2405 5.29 16.47 0 115 
U: Average age of spinouts 2405 2.33 2.62 0 12 
U: Foundation year 2405 1838 207 1088 2004 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 2405 6.60 2.26 0 10.48 
U: University size 2405 7.26 1.13 1.39 9.28 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 2405 0.25 0.43 0 1 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75% 2405 0.26 0.44 0 1 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 2405 0.24 0.43 0 1 
U: Education Field; General 2405 1.01 0.07 1 2 
U: Education Field; Education 2405 1.72 0.45 1 2 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts 2405 1.90 0.30 1 2 
U: Education Field; Social Sci., Business and Law 2405 1.97 0.16 1 2 
U: Education Field; Sciences 2405 1.91 0.29 1 2 
U: Education Field; Engineering, Manufacturing 
and Construction 2405 1.85 0.36 1 2 
U: Education Field; Agriculture 2405 1.48 0.50 1 2 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare 2405 1.89 0.31 1 2 
U: Education Field; Services 2405 1.64 0.48 1 2 
U: Industrial variance 2405 2.03 3.14 0 24.5 
U: Hi-tech firm rate 2405 0.09 0.25 0 1 
 
Regional-level controls      
R: R&D expenditure 2405 5.89 0.79 3.46 7.87 
R: Population 2405 14.65 0.69 12.65 16.09 
R: Unemployment rate 2405 7.18 4.05 1.8 27.3 
 
Country-level controls      
C: GDP per capita 2405 10.52 0.10 10.39 11.10 
C: Easiness of doing business 2405 13.14 4.10 6 23 
C: Unemployment rate 2405 6.80 1.82 2.5 10.8 
C: Investment freedom 2405 77.62 10.01 50 90 
C: VC availability 2405 617.49 893.6 22 4240.39 
 
U=University-level variable; R=Regional-level variable; C=Country-level variable 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 U: Spinout quantity 1.00 
               2 U: Spinout quality 0.46 1.00 
              3 U: TTO establishment 0.14 0.08 1.00 
             4 C: IPR Institutional changes 0.02 -0.13 -0.36 1.00 
            5 U: Cumulative entry 0.65 0.53 0.17 -0.03 1.00 
           6 U: Prior knowledge in tech-transfer activities 0.17 0.19 0.17 -0.06 0.46 1.00 
          7 U: Average age of spinouts 0.64 0.57 0.12 -0.18 0.73 0.23 1.00 
         8 U: Foundation year -0.31 -0.17 -0.05 -0.19 -0.32 -0.14 -0.34 1.00 
        9 U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.40 0.27 0.03 0.21 0.44 0.43 0.35 -0.30 1.00 
       10 U: University size 0.31 0.29 0.32 -0.53 0.37 0.33 0.36 -0.25 0.41 1.00 
      11 U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.30 0.24 -0.07 -0.02 0.34 0.17 0.31 -0.11 0.28 0.15 1.00 
     12 U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75%  0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.02 -0.07 0.18 0.13 -0.34 1.00 
    13 U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% -0.15 -0.13 0.09 0.01 -0.17 -0.14 -0.16 0.05 -0.18 -0.08 -0.33 -0.33 1.00 
   14 U: Education Field; General  0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 1.00 
  15 U: Educ. Field; Education  -0.02 0.00 0.13 -0.26 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11 0.27 -0.23 0.06 0.08 0.05 1.00 
 16 U: Educ. Field; Humanities and Arts -0.04 -0.05 0.11 -0.31 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 0.02 0.43 -0.08 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.34 1.00 
17 U: Educ. Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law  -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.22 -0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.27 0.38 
18 U: Educ. Field; Sciences  0.09 0.08 0.24 -0.33 0.10 0.18 0.10 -0.13 0.18 0.52 -0.10 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.32 
19 U: Educ. Field; Engin., Manuf. and Construction  0.15 0.09 0.27 -0.09 0.16 0.14 0.12 -0.13 0.25 0.37 -0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.17 0.14 0.01 
20 U: Educ. Field; Agriculture 0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.09 0.11 0.05 0.15 -0.17 0.08 0.23 -0.16 0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.17 0.15 
21 U: Educ. Field; Health and Welfare  0.06 0.07 0.14 -0.12 0.06 0.12 0.08 -0.15 0.12 0.31 -0.12 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.29 0.28 
22 U: Educ. Field; Services -0.16 -0.20 -0.01 0.25 -0.21 -0.16 -0.22 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.39 -0.01 0.19 0.06 0.20 0.15 
23 U: Industrial variance 0.33 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.15 -0.25 0.43 0.16 0.13 0.12 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 
24 U: Hi-tech firm rate 0.29 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.20 0.15 0.13 -0.06 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.03 -0.05 0.18 0.01 -0.05 
25 R: R&D expenditure 0.10 0.20 0.09 -0.40 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.29 0.19 0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.07 0.13 
26 R: Population -0.01 -0.08 -0.19 0.41 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.12 -0.21 0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 
27 R: Unemployment rate -0.09 -0.09 -0.20 0.33 -0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.22 -0.16 -0.17 0.11 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 
28 C: GDP per capita 0.06 0.24 0.28 -0.51 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.28 0.19 0.12 
29 C: Easiness of doing business -0.08 -0.05 -0.36 0.15 -0.20 -0.33 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
30 C: Unemployment rate -0.08 -0.16 -0.32 0.63 0.01 0.12 -0.10 -0.14 0.06 -0.38 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.13 -0.19 -0.18 
31 C: Investment freedom -0.08 0.04 0.23 -0.55 0.13 0.32 0.11 0.09 -0.15 0.28 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.17 0.11 0.19 
32 C: VC availability -0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.46 -0.04 -0.10 0.08 0.08 -0.11 0.22 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.15 
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  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
17 U: Educ. Field; Social Sci., Business and Law  1.00 
               18 U: Educ. Field; Sciences  0.41 1.00 
              19 U: Educ. Field; Engin., Manuf. and Construction  0.02 0.28 1.00 
             20 U: Educ. Field; Agriculture 0.16 0.23 0.17 1.00 
            21 U: Educ. Field; Health and Welfare  0.37 0.49 0.19 0.20 1.00 
           22 U: Educ. Field; Services 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.28 1.00 
          23 U: Industrial variance -0.04 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.04 -0.01 1.00 
         24 U: Hi-tech firm rate -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.10 0.21 1.00 
        25 R: R&D expenditure 0.05 0.14 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.19 -0.08 0.07 1.00 
       26 R: Population -0.20 -0.31 -0.12 -0.19 -0.23 0.12 0.04 -0.10 0.02 1.00 
      27 R: Unemployment rate -0.01 -0.19 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.00 -0.08 -0.45 0.26 1.00 
     28 C: GDP per capita 0.13 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.21 -0.03 0.21 0.37 -0.38 -0.34 1.00 
    29 C: Easiness of doing business -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.26 -0.07 -0.19 0.07 0.11 -0.27 1.00 
   30 C: Unemployment rate -0.14 -0.23 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 0.20 0.10 -0.11 -0.36 0.35 0.48 -0.68 0.22 1.00 
  31 C: Investment freedom 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.14 0.16 -0.11 -0.03 0.26 -0.19 0.01 1.00 
 32 C: VC availability 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 0.19 -0.17 -0.19 0.37 0.02 -0.38 0.29 1.00 
 
Number of observation: 2405; Correlations above |0.04| are significant at 5% 
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Table 3 Results of Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression: Spin-off Quantity 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
U: TTO establishment  0.178* 0.085 
  (0.085) (0.087) 
C: IPR Institutional changes  0.521*** 0.262** 
  (0.067) (0.094) 
UxC: TTO X IPR Institutional changes   0.336*** 
   (0.084) 
U: Prior knowledge in technology-transfer activities 0.260*** 0.283*** 0.307*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
U: Foundation year -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.833*** 0.657*** 0.596*** 
 (0.082) (0.077) (0.078) 
U: Size 0.199* 0.342*** 0.343*** 
 (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.842*** 0.910*** 0.933*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 0.682*** 0.746*** 0.786*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75%  0.180 0.179 0.202+ 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) 
U: Education Field; General  0.473 0.389 0.433 
 (0.421) (0.412) (0.409) 
U: Education Field; Education  -0.039 -0.051 -0.116 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts -0.096 0.011 0.029 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.130) 
U: Education Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law  -1.224*** -0.982*** -0.980*** 
 (0.280) (0.276) (0.274) 
U: Education Field; Sciences  0.708** 0.634** 0.525* 
 (0.219) (0.214) (0.215) 
U: Education Field; Engin, Manufacturing and Construction  0.486** 0.470** 0.539*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 
U: Education Field; Agriculture 0.012 0.026 0.022 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare  0.045 -0.042 0.098 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.182) 
U: Education Field; Services 0.164+ 0.055 0.081 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
U: High-tech firm rate 0.270*** 0.250*** 0.246*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
R: R&D expenditure -0.139** -0.113* -0.131** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
R: Population -0.142*** -0.162*** -0.158*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
R: Unemployment rate 0.066 0.082+ 0.090+ 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
C: GDP per capita -0.083 -0.131** -0.105* 
 (0.067) (0.049) (0.050) 
C: Easiness of doing business -0.130* -0.123** -0.096* 
 (0.061) (0.040) (0.042) 
C: Unemployment rate -0.083 -0.289*** -0.274*** 
 (0.092) (0.059) (0.061) 
Constant -1.391+ -2.093* -2.241** 
 (0.830) (0.832) (0.826) 
Variance of intercept 0.097* 0.013 0.015 
 (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 2,405 2,405 2,405 
Number of groups 39 39 39 
Log likelihood -2353 -2329 -2321 
Degrees of Freedom 23 25 26 
Chi2 1415*** 1485*** 1513*** 
 
Standard errors –clustered by country-year– are in parentheses. +. p < 0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; 
p<0.1+. Observations are grouped per country-year. Continuous variables are standardized. Country-
year fixed effects included.  
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Table 4 Results of Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression: Spin-off Quality 
 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
U: TTO establishment 
 
-0.342+ -0.527* 
  
(0.208) (0.207) 
C: IPR Institutional changes 
 
-0.590** -0.099 
  
(0.189) (0.246) 
UxC: TTO X IPR Institutional changes 
  
-0.685** 
   
(0.239) 
U: Cumulative entry 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.045) (0.042) (0.040) 
U: Average age of spinouts -0.017 0.066 0.110 
 
(0.130) (0.123) (0.120) 
U: Foundation year 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
U: Size 1.566*** 1.165*** 1.110*** 
 
(0.228) (0.269) (0.260) 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.339 0.485* 0.608** 
 
(0.211) (0.233) (0.232) 
U: Education Field; General 3.703*** 3.687*** 3.423*** 
 
(1.061) (1.051) (1.039) 
U: Education Field; Education -0.037 -0.097 0.020 
 
(0.161) (0.168) (0.169) 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts -0.669* -0.818** -0.749** 
 
(0.291) (0.291) (0.284) 
U: Education Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law 1.488 0.805 0.606 
 
(1.047) (1.081) (1.082) 
U: Education Field; Sciences 1.016 1.082 1.177 
 
(1.254) (1.284) (1.281) 
U: Education Field; Engin, Manufacturing and Construction 1.608* 1.801* 1.605* 
 
(0.776) (0.773) (0.768) 
U: Education Field; Agriculture -0.051 -0.093 -0.083 
 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.156) 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare -0.897+ -0.538 -0.706 
 
(0.480) (0.484) (0.485) 
U: Education Field; Services -0.171 0.051 0.037 
 
(0.200) (0.206) (0.203) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.852* 0.833+ 0.788+ 
 
(0.432) (0.434) (0.430) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 0.791+ 0.814+ 0.738+ 
 
(0.418) (0.418) (0.415) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75% -0.062 0.007 -0.066 
 
(0.462) (0.462) (0.463) 
U: Industrial variance 0.382*** 0.406*** 0.429*** 
 
(0.103) (0.098) (0.093) 
U: Hi-tech firm rate -0.033 -0.013 -0.019 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.053) 
R: R&D expenditure 0.014 -0.055 -0.014 
 
(0.102) (0.105) (0.103) 
R: Population 0.021 0.179 0.204+ 
 
(0.110) (0.121) (0.120) 
R: Unemployment rate -0.327* -0.329* -0.385* 
 
(0.163) (0.162) (0.161) 
C: GDP per capita 0.190* 0.287*** 0.291*** 
 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.078) 
C: Investment freedom -0.005 -0.138 -0.135 
 
(0.097) (0.101) (0.098) 
C: VC availability 0.041 0.007 0.004 
 
(0.078) (0.064) (0.063) 
Constant -13.074*** -11.467*** -10.741** 
 
(3.347) (3.330) (3.324) 
Variance of intercept 0.023 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.044) (0.031) (0.028) 
Observations 2,405 2,405 2,405 
Number of groups 39 39 39 
Log likelihood -663.1 -657.6 -653.8 
Degrees of Freedom 25 27 28 
Chi2 499.5*** 537.1*** 562.8*** 
 
Standard errors –clustered by country-year– are in parentheses. p < 0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; p<0.1+. 
Observations are grouped per country-year. Continuous variables are standardized. Country-year fixed effects 
included. 
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Fig. 1 - Interaction effects of TTO and IPR institutional changes on the quantity of 
university spin-offs 
 
                          Predictive margins of TTO        Conditional marginal effect of TTO 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 - Interaction effects of TTO and IPR institutional changes on the quality of 
university spin-offs 
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Appendix A-1 Results of Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression: Spin-off Quantity 
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a 
U: TTO establishment  0.181* -0.179 
  (0.085) (0.122) 
C: IPR Institutional changes  2.742*** 1.358** 
  (0.358) (0.500) 
UxC: TTO X Institutional changes a   1.809*** 
   (0.454) 
U: Prior knowledge in technology-transfer activities 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
U: Foundation year -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.369*** 0.292*** 0.265*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) 
U: Size 0.176* 0.296*** 0.298*** 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.842*** 0.912*** 0.933*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 0.682*** 0.747*** 0.785*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75%  0.180 0.178 0.200+ 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) 
U: Education Field; General  0.473 0.360 0.418 
 (0.421) (0.412) (0.410) 
U: Education Field; Education  -0.039 -0.053 -0.117 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts -0.096 0.018 0.036 
 (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) 
U: Education Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law  -1.224*** -0.992*** -0.989*** 
 (0.280) (0.275) (0.274) 
U: Education Field; Sciences  0.708** 0.639** 0.530* 
 (0.219) (0.214) (0.215) 
U: Education Field; Engineering, Manufacturing and 
  
0.486** 0.473** 0.541*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 
U: Education Field; Agriculture 0.012 0.028 0.024 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare  0.045 -0.041 0.099 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.182) 
U: Education Field; Services 0.164+ 0.058 0.084 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
U: High-tech firm rate 1.083*** 1.000*** 0.987*** 
 (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) 
R: R&D expenditure -0.176** -0.147** -0.169** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
R: Population -0.206*** -0.227*** -0.224*** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) 
R: Unemployment rate 0.016 0.020+ 0.022+ 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
C: GDP per capita -0.820 -1.439** -1.214* 
 (0.666) (0.493) (0.500) 
C: Easiness of doing business -0.032* -0.031** -0.024* 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
C: Unemployment rate -0.045 -0.158*** -0.151*** 
 (0.050) (0.033) (0.034) 
Constant 8.002 13.933* 11.690* 
 (7.435) (5.472) (5.539) 
Variance of intercept 0.097* 0.013 0.016 
 (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 2,405 2,405 2,405 
Number of groups 39 39 39 
Log likelihood -2353 -2329 -2321 
Degrees of Freedom 23 25 26 
Chi2 1415*** 1485*** 1513*** 
Standard errors –clustered by country-year– are in parentheses. p < 0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; 
p<0.1+. Observations are grouped per country-year. Country-year fixed effects included. a: measured 
as the number of years in which professor has IPR privilege divided by years observation time (13 
years).  
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Appendix A-2 Results of Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression: Spin-off Quantity 
  Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
U: TTO establishment  0.178* -0.181 
  (0.085) (0.121) 
C: IPR Institutional changes  0.543*** 0.273** 
  (0.070) (0.098) 
UxC: TTO X Institutional changes a   0.351*** 
   (0.088) 
U: Prior knowledge in technology-transfer activities 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
U: Foundation year -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.369*** 0.291*** 0.264*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) 
U: Size 0.176* 0.302*** 0.303*** 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.842*** 0.910*** 0.933*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 0.682*** 0.746*** 0.786*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75%  0.180 0.179 0.202+ 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) 
U: Education Field; General  0.473 0.389 0.433 
 (0.421) (0.412) (0.409) 
U: Education Field; Education  -0.039 -0.051 -0.116 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts -0.096 0.011 0.029 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.130) 
U: Education Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law  -1.224*** -0.982*** -0.980*** 
 (0.280) (0.276) (0.274) 
U: Education Field; Sciences  0.708** 0.634** 0.525* 
 (0.219) (0.214) (0.215) 
U: Education Field; Engineering, Manufacturing and 
  
0.486** 0.470** 0.539*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 
U: Education Field; Agriculture 0.012 0.026 0.022 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare  0.045 -0.042 0.098 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.182) 
U: Education Field; Services 0.164+ 0.055 0.081 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
U: High-tech firm rate 1.083*** 1.005*** 0.989*** 
 (0.107) (0.104) (0.103) 
R: R&D expenditure -0.176** -0.143* -0.166** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
R: Population -0.206*** -0.234*** -0.229*** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) 
R: Unemployment rate 0.016 0.020+ 0.022+ 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
C: GDP per capita -0.820 -1.304** -1.044* 
 (0.666) (0.486) (0.494) 
C: Easiness of doing business -0.032* -0.030** -0.023* 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
C: Unemployment rate -0.045 -0.158*** -0.150*** 
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.033) 
Constant 8.002 12.516* 9.905+ 
 (7.435) (5.401) (5.482) 
Variance of intercept 0.097* 0.013 0.015 
 (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 2,405 2,405 2,405 
Number of groups 39 39 39 
Log likelihood -2353 -2329 -2321 
Degrees of Freedom 23 25 26 
Chi2 1415*** 1485*** 1513*** 
Standard errors –clustered by country-year– are in parentheses. p < 0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; 
p<0.1+. Observations are grouped per country-year. Country-year fixed effects included. a: measured 
by absolute number of changes in IPR institution in a country.  
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Appendix B-1 Results of Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression: Spin-off Quality 
 
 
Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a 
U: TTO establishment 
 
-0.345+ 0.038 
  
(0.208) (0.245) 
C: IPR Institutional changes 
 
-3.078** -0.402 
  
(0.997) (1.295) 
UxC: TTO X IPR Institutional changes 
  
-3.778** 
   
(1.263) 
U: Cumulative entry 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
U: Average age of spinouts -0.006 0.027 0.045 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046) 
U: Foundation year 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
U: Size 1.382*** 1.043*** 0.986*** 
 
(0.201) (0.236) (0.228) 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.150 0.210* 0.267** 
 
(0.093) (0.103) (0.102) 
U: Education Field; General 3.703*** 3.707*** 3.411** 
 
(1.061) (1.052) (1.039) 
U: Education Field; Education -0.037 -0.097 0.028 
 
(0.161) (0.168) (0.169) 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts -0.669* -0.823** -0.748** 
 
(0.291) (0.292) (0.284) 
U: Education Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law 1.488 0.834 0.635 
 
(1.047) (1.078) (1.078) 
U: Education Field; Sciences 1.016 1.068 1.168 
 
(1.254) (1.282) (1.279) 
U: Education Field; Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 1.608* 1.802* 1.594* 
 
(0.776) (0.773) (0.768) 
U: Education Field; Agriculture -0.051 -0.096 -0.083 
 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.156) 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare -0.897+ -0.547 -0.723 
 
(0.480) (0.484) (0.484) 
U: Education Field; Services -0.171 0.046 0.033 
 
(0.200) (0.206) (0.203) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.852* 0.831+ 0.785+ 
 
(0.432) (0.434) (0.429) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 0.791+ 0.813+ 0.735+ 
 
(0.418) (0.418) (0.415) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75% -0.062 0.010 -0.068 
 
(0.462) (0.462) (0.463) 
U: Industrial variance 0.122*** 0.129*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) 
U: Hi-tech firm rate -0.131 -0.048 -0.076 
 
(0.221) (0.215) (0.211) 
R: R&D expenditure 0.018 -0.066 -0.009 
 
(0.129) (0.132) (0.130) 
R: Population 0.031 0.244 0.289+ 
 
(0.159) (0.174) (0.171) 
R: Unemployment rate -0.081* -0.080* -0.094* 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
C: GDP per capita 1.890* 2.958*** 3.074*** 
 
(0.786) (0.810) (0.781) 
C: Investment freedom -0.001 -0.015 -0.014 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
C: VC availability 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -44.258*** -53.031*** -54.789*** 
 
(9.595) (9.578) (9.269) 
Variance of intercept 0.023 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.044) (0.031) (0.027) 
Observations 2,405 2,405 2,405 
Number of groups 39 39 39 
Log likelihood -663.1 -657.7 -653.5 
Degrees of Freedom 25 27 28 
Chi2 499.5*** 536.7*** 565.2*** 
Standard errors –clustered by country-year– are in parentheses. p < 0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; 
p<0.1+. Observations are grouped per country-year. Country-year fixed effects included. a: measured 
as the number of years in which professor has IPR privilege divided by years observation time (13 
years). 
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Appendix B-2 Results of Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression: Spin-off Quality 
 
Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b 
U: TTO establishment 
 
-0.342+ 0.014 
  
(0.208) (0.243) 
C: IPR Institutional changes 
 
-0.615** -0.103 
  
(0.197) (0.257) 
UxC: TTO X IPR Institutional changes 
  
-0.714** 
   
(0.249) 
U: Cumulative entry 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
U: Average age of spinouts -0.006 0.025 0.042 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046) 
U: Foundation year 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
U: Size 1.382*** 1.029*** 0.980*** 
 
(0.201) (0.238) (0.230) 
U: Sponsored research expenditure 0.150 0.215* 0.269** 
 
(0.093) (0.103) (0.103) 
U: Education Field; General 3.703*** 3.687*** 3.423*** 
 
(1.061) (1.051) (1.039) 
U: Education Field; Education -0.037 -0.097 0.020 
 
(0.161) (0.168) (0.169) 
U: Education Field; Humanities and Arts -0.669* -0.818** -0.749** 
 
(0.291) (0.291) (0.284) 
U: Education Field; Social Sciences, Business and Law 1.488 0.805 0.606 
 
(1.047) (1.081) (1.082) 
U: Education Field; Sciences 1.016 1.082 1.177 
 
(1.254) (1.284) (1.281) 
U: Education Field; Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 1.608* 1.801* 1.605* 
 
(0.776) (0.773) (0.768) 
U: Education Field; Agriculture -0.051 -0.093 -0.083 
 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.156) 
U: Education Field; Health and Welfare -0.897+ -0.538 -0.706 
 
(0.480) (0.484) (0.485) 
U: Education Field; Services -0.171 0.051 0.037 
 
(0.200) (0.206) (0.203) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank top 25% 0.852* 0.833+ 0.788+ 
 
(0.432) (0.434) (0.430) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 25-50% 0.791+ 0.814+ 0.738+ 
 
(0.418) (0.418) (0.415) 
U: Intellectual eminence: Rank 50-75% -0.062 0.007 -0.066 
 
(0.462) (0.462) (0.463) 
U: Industrial variance 0.122*** 0.129*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) 
U: Hi-tech firm rate -0.131 -0.052 -0.078 
 
(0.221) (0.215) (0.211) 
R: R&D expenditure 0.018 -0.070 -0.018 
 
(0.129) (0.132) (0.130) 
R: Population 0.031 0.259 0.295+ 
 
(0.159) (0.175) (0.173) 
R: Unemployment rate -0.081* -0.081* -0.095* 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
C: GDP per capita 1.890* 2.852*** 2.894*** 
 
(0.786) (0.803) (0.776) 
C: Investment freedom -0.001 -0.014 -0.013 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
C: VC availability 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -44.258*** -52.030*** -52.928*** 
 
(9.595) (9.561) (9.266) 
Variance of intercept 0.023 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.044) (0.031) (0.028) 
Observations 2,405 2,405 2,405 
Number of groups 39 39 39 
Log likelihood -663.1 -657.6 -653.8 
Degrees of Freedom 25 27 28 
Chi2 499.5*** 537.1*** 562.8*** 
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Standard errors –clustered by country-year– are in parentheses. p < 0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; 
p<0.1+. Observations are grouped per country-year. Country-year fixed effects included. a: measured 
by absolute number of changes in IPR institution in a country.  
 
 
 
Fig. A-1/2 - Interaction effects with confidence intervals (95%) 
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